
















Economics Institute PolicyNote 2003 /5
L. RANDALL WRAY is a senior scholar atThe Levy Economics Institute. He is a professor of economics and a senior research




For the first time since the 1930s, many worry that the world’s economy faces 
the prospect of deflation—accompanied by massive job losses—on a global scale.
In a rather hopeful sign, policymakers from euroland to Japan to America all 
seem to recognize the threat that falling prices pose to markets. Given the single-
minded pursuit of deflationary policies over the past decade, this does come 
as something of a surprise. But policymakers—especially central bankers—in
Europe and the United States seem to have little inkling of how to stave off
deflation, with the result that prices are already falling in much of the world.
Contrary to widespread beliefs, the worst outcome will not be avoided if the only
response is to balance budgets and introduce new monetary policy gimmicks. To 
the contrary, policymakers should increase deficits to at least 7 percent of GDP.
THE CHIEF WEAPON CALLED UPON IN RECENT YEARS by inflation warriors has been the
balanced government budget. The hinterlands were supposed to go further, with the adop-
tion of exchange rate pegs, or, better still, currency boards based on the dollar in order to
take away the possibility of running independent fiscal policy. Euroland upped the ante by
abandoning national currencies altogether in favor of a stateless euro, beyond the control of
any nation. In the monetary policy sphere, central banks were told to adopt money-growth
targets, and when they failed to achieve them, inflation targets were sold as the ultimate test
of central banker machismo. Fiscal and monetary restraint would wipe out inflation and
lead to rapid productivity growth, full employment, and naturally robust growth.
Well, something happened on the way to the forum, as high unemployment, fiscal and
financial crises, and stagnant growth reared their collective ugly heads. While one mighthave expected policymakers to celebrate their victory over inflation and to ignore the collat-
eral damage done to economies, they have instead quickly and publicly begun to fret about
the horrors of deflation.1
Pervasive Stagnation
The Japanese economy has stagnated for more than 10 years, even with zero interest rates for
half a decade and even while the Bank of Japan supposedly “pumps money” into the econ-
omy until the cows come home.Argentina, poster child for the wisdom of currency boards—
and for IMF austerity policies generally—simply imploded at the beginning of the new
millennium. Growth in Germany has remained below 1.5 percent for a decade, even with the
fall of the Berlin Wall and the investment and growth opportunities opened up in the East.
France, Italy, and Portugal suffer rising unemployment and stagnant
growth while, along with Germany, they test Maastricht limits to govern-
ment deficits—which even Romano Prodi, the president of the council of
the European Union, has labeled “stupid.” The major Asian exporters,
most notably China and Japan, are already experiencing deflation and are
placing severe downward pressure on prices in international markets.
The United States, main engine of growth over the 1990s, has stagnated
since 2001—just managing to avoid slipping again into semi-official def-
initions of recession. Unemployment has steadily risen, even though
most job-losers are uncounted because they have simply left the labor
force, having found out that it is impossible to find work in the current
environment; indeed, we’ve lost 2.6 million jobs (Davey with Leonhardt
2003; Altman 2003). Americans have seen their net wealth fall dramati-
cally. At the same time, private indebtedness has continued to climb as consumers borrow
against home equity in a desperate, precarious, and ultimately unsustainable attempt to
maintain living standards in the face of job loss and pay cuts.
And what do policymakers have up their sleeves to relieve the dreaded deflationary pressures?
In euroland,the solution is supposed to be market reform and fiscal constraint.Yes,let me say
that again. Markets must be “reformed” to eliminate protection for workers, consumers, the
elderly, and the environment, so that wages, prices, and incomes can fall sufficiently to com-
pete with low-cost Asian producers (Bernstein 2003; Heise 2002; Roby 2002). Further,
euroland hopes to reign in those black-sheep governments that are irresponsibly “spending
beyond their means”(Osborn 2002; Landler 2002). In truth, under current arrangements the
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become much like U.S. states.euro nations will be forced to slash spending and increase taxes anyway, as soon as markets
realize that those nations have given up currency sovereignty and become much like U.S.
states (or, worse, like Argentina under the currency board). Hence, both markets and policy-
makers will ramp up deflationary pressures over the coming months in an attempt to fight
deflation.
The Fed to the Rescue?
Fortunately, policymakers in America do not speak with such a uniformly misguided
approach. True, the Fed under Chairman Greenspan’s leadership appears to have no inkling of
what needs to be done. To his limited credit, Greenspan has given lukewarm support to tax
cuts, but in the same breath he worries about prospective government deficits and warns poli-
cymakers that spending cuts are necessary (Rosenbaum 2003a). He claims
the rising deficits will put upward pressure on interest rates, presumably
knowing all too well that interest rates were actually falling so long as mar-
kets expected that the Fed would not raise the federal funds target in the
near future (Leonhardt 2003). Interest rates have now reversed course on
Greenspan’s recent testimony that was interpreted to mean that the Fed
would raise rates at the first hint of economic recovery (Morgenson 2003).
He publicly fretted about the possibility of deflation, but argued that the
Fed can prevent that by “pumping money”into the economy, buying long-
term bonds if necessary2 (Andrews 2002; Leonhardt 2003).
Anyone with even an elementary knowledge of central bank operations
knows that no central bank can “pump money” into the economy as if it
were flying black helicopters and dropping bags of newly printed greenbacks into backyards.
It is true that the Fed can buy more long-term bonds by crediting private banks with more
reserves, but this simply leads to excess reserve positions and pushes the federal funds rate to
zero (as in Japan). If the Fed doesn’t want overnight (interbank lending) rates at zero, it must
turn right around and sell short-term bills to drain the excess reserves it just created when it
bought long-term bonds. The final result is not that money has been “pumped”into the econ-
omy, but rather that the central bank holds more long-term bonds and fewer short-term bills,
while banks hold the reverse position. There might be some reason to implement such a policy
(known as “Operation Twist” in the early 1960s, when it was undertaken to try to lower long
interest rates, with mixed success), but it is plain obfuscation to call this “pumping money,”
and it is highly delusional to believe it will be sufficient to stop deflation.
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President Bush has been proposing tax cuts as a cure-all. To be sure, the federal budget’s
swing from a surplus of over 2 percent of GDP before recession to the current deficit of 4.5
percent of GDP has played a significant role in helping the economy to drag itself out of offi-
cial recession. Some of the turnabout has resulted from the president’s earlier tax relief legis-
lation, which totals some $1.3 trillion over a decade. Unfortunately, that figure is deceptively
large. First, it averages to less than $130 billion annually—a little over 1 percent of GDP today
and much less as time passes. Second, much of it is back-loaded, with most benefits to be
received later. Further, the tax relief is measured against what revenues might have been had
the economy resumed robust growth, an assumption that now appears highly implausible. In
other words,it is counting reductions of taxes that wouldn’t have been paid.
Indeed, much of the budget turnaround thus far has little to do with tax
relief, and not even much to do with increased spending for the military
(not included in the deficit figures yet), enhanced security spending, or
funds for rebuilding New York City. Rather, the budget has moved to large
deficits because economic performance has deteriorated sufficiently to
wipe out tax revenues. While this does help to put a floor on aggregate
demand and thereby helps to hold recession at bay,it does not actively put
the economy back into shape to restore growth. This is why job losses
continue to mount. It is unlikely that robust growth can be resumed with
a federal deficit less than 7 percent of GDP—requiring a combination of
additional spending increases and tax cuts of some $250 billion annually.
By comparison the recent tax cuts passed would provide only about one-seventh of that—
some $350 billion, spread over 10 years (Rosenbaum 2003b). What is more, the tax cuts are
temporary and, as designed, give little “bang for the buck.” While the tax relief measures for
married couples and children could stimulate demand,they are slated to expire after 2004.The
lower rates on capital gains and dividends will last through 2008, but they won’t help to jump
start the economy or the stock market, for the simple reason that there have to be taxable capi-
tal gains and dividends before this form of relief means much.It is possible that the stock mar-
ket will begin to recover before the 2008 expiration date, but it is highly unlikely that Wall
Street will lead the economy out of its current doldrums. Again, the tax relief in these plans is
largely calculated against future taxes that would not have been paid according to any likely
scenario regarding dividends and capital gains.This is no reason to oppose the plan,but it pro-
vides plenty of ammunition against the claim that the plan is a stimulus package.
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out of its current doldrums.Note also that many supporters of tax relief are quick to agree with Greenspan that if deficits
continue to grow, some combination of tax increases and spending cuts will be needed in
the future. Even the president has pledged to trim the deficit, proclaiming that “spending
discipline is crucial to my economic program”—in other words, he plans to undo what little
stimulus might have been provided by his tax cuts (Bloomberg 2003a).
There is much talk about being able to “afford” the tax cuts. The future onslaught of baby-
boomer retirees is mentioned as a reason to be concerned about a coming budget “crisis”—
which, of course, is part of the reason for the sunset provisions in the tax relief legislation.
Some Democrats, trying to position their party as defenders of fiscal responsibility, long for
the days of budget surpluses, not realizing that it was the budget surpluses in the United
States (and “fiscal responsibility” in much of the rest of the world) that generated the defla-
tionary pressures in the first place. Similarly, the current president has argued that “govern-
ments should follow the example of American families by setting
priorities and staying with them” (Bloomberg 2003a), completely
unaware that American families ran up record deficits (and debts) during
the Clinton expansion, precisely when the federal government was run-
ning surpluses!3
For this reason, it is hard to get up much hope that even in the United
States—which has at its disposal the ability to adopt sensible policy—
policymakers will take decisive, discretionary action to move the short-
term budget stance toward a deficit of at least 7 percent of GDP, and to
move the long-term (full employment) structural budget to a deficit of
3–4 percent of GDP. This is what policymakers must do if they are seri-
ous about putting the United States back onto a sustainable growth path.
Argentina: Moving in the Right Direction
Ironically, Argentina seems to be emerging from its economic crisis with sensible policy—
made possible when it abandoned the currency board and floated its currency. Argentina’s
new president, Nestor Kirchner, has argued that his country “can survive without an I.M.F.
deal,” and that it “has little or no chance of paying the amounts sought” by creditors, rightly
recognizing that Argentina’s dollar-denominated debts cannot and will not be paid (Rohter
2003; Bloomberg 2003b; Smith 2003).
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We can only hope that U.S.
policymakers will find 
enough backbone to relax 
our federal budget and 
allow robust growth to resume.Most important, Kirchner has argued that Argentina will spend its way out of recession and
bankruptcy—exactly the medicine needed and feasible now that Argentina has dropped the
dollar peg. He has announced plans to build 3 million new homes and promised many more
public works projects. Argentina is also offering a limited “employer of last resort”program,
to provide jobs to heads of household who cannot otherwise find them. If the nation can
keep up its nerve and ignore the budget-balancers, it may well avoid the fate to which
euroland seems destined. We can only hope that U.S. policymakers will find enough back-
bone to relax our federal budget and allow robust growth to resume.
The Risk of Asset and Debt Deflation
The dangers of deflation are real and already present. As mentioned, American household
net worth has fallen sharply even as indebtedness reached new heights.
Monetary policy has little power left, because interest rates have already
fallen so low that debt service burdens cannot be reduced significantly
through further interest rate reductions. This means that lower rates
can stimulate growth only by encouraging more borrowing and raising
debt service burdens (both are already high—debt ratios are easily at an
all-time high, while debt-service ratios are close to record highs). The
faltering stock market, together with low mortgage rates, pulled wealth
into real estate, which now shows signs of bubbles in many regions.
Other nations also have evidence of real estate bubbles—particularly in
some of euroland (Spain, Italy, the Netherlands), in Australia, and in the United Kingdom
(Crooks 2003).
In other words, there is a danger that real estate asset prices will fall in many regions of the
world—just as equity markets fell during the past three years. A real estate collapse in the
United States would imperil the financial situation of a much broader cross section of U.S.
households than did the stock market collapse. Rising unemployment and job losses, cascad-
ing bankruptcies, collapsing asset prices and falling net worth, stagnant wages, growth of
GDP that is well under half of potential, a lack of business investment, and plummeting tax
revenue at state and national levels should all be taken as evidence that if deflation has not
yet arrived, it is dangerously close.
As the 1930s demonstrated, it is best to act early and decisively. Many have credited
Greenspan with doing just that, but monetary policy cannot help further (even if it did help
already), because interest rates are already low. In spite of proclamations by monetary poli-
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economy to halt deflation pressures.cymakers, the Fed’s only tool is the overnight rate; it cannot “pump money” into the econ-
omy to halt deflation pressures. However, sovereign nations that issue their own floating
currency (euroland is the only notable exception among the major developed countries) can
use fiscal policy to raise demand, without worrying about balancing budgets. Given the high
propensity around the globe to save in the form of U.S. dollar assets (and, in particular, in
the form of U.S. treasuries), much of the responsibility for restoring world economic growth
rests on the shoulders of the U.S. federal government. But it is not a “burden”for the federal
government to spend its way to economic prosperity. All that is required is the will to put
unemployed resources back to work.
Notes
1. Exactly what is meant by the term “deflation”is usually not clear. See Papadimitriou and
Wray (forthcoming) for a detailed analysis. Here, we will use the term simply to indicate
downward pressure on prices due, mostly, to insufficient aggregate demand. This does
not necessarily mean that any particular measure of prices (say, the CPI) is likely to
decline.
2. For the most complete statement of the Fed’s view on how it might fight deflation even
after the federal funds rate is pushed to zero, see Remarks by Governor Ben S. Bernanke
Before the National Economists Club, Washington, D.C., November 21, 2002,“Deflation:
Making Sure ‘It’ Doesn’t Happen Here” (www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/
2002/200221121/default.htm).
3. There are a number of mistakes in the president’s statement. First, the federal govern-
ment is the issuer of our currency, while households are in the position of users of the
currency. While this is not the place to go into this in detail, sovereign issuers of the cur-
rency can run sustained deficits (which is not the same thing as saying that they always
should, nor that there are no negative impacts of large, sustained budget deficits).
Second, the president does not seem to understand that there is an aggregate accounting
identity according to which the private sector balance equals the sum of the government
sector balance (including all levels of government) and the foreign sector balance (the
current account). By the end of the Clinton expansion, the government surplus was
about 2.5 percent of GDP and the current account deficit was about 4 percent of GDP;
together, these summed to about 6.5 percent, which equaled the private sector deficit
(meaning the private sector spent over $106 for every $100 earned). Given the likely con-
tinuation of a current account deficit, the private sector cannot run a balanced budget if
the government balances its budget. A government deficit of some 4–5 percent of GDP
will be required to allow the private sector to balance its budget.
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